Showing posts with label hedging. Show all posts
Showing posts with label hedging. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 25, 2012

ANALYSIS: Should airlines hedge their bets on fuel?

English: Chart of jet fuel prices for major US...
English: Chart of jet fuel prices for major US airlines. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
ANALYSIS: Should airlines hedge their bets on fuel?:

Remember the difference between operational hedges (example Delta's purchase of an oil refinery) and financial hedging (hedging with financial derivatives).  And my prior on this is that hedging should be done and it is best to do it with financial hedging whenever possible.


From Flightglobal.com ANALYSIS: Should airlines hedge their bets on fuel?:

"When Delta Air Lines announced its intention to acquire an oil refinery earlier this year, the unusual move drew a mixed response from analysts. Some praised its innovation, arguing that its daily consumption of 210,000 barrels of jet fuel justified cutting out the middle man. Others questioned whether airlines should be in the business of refining crude oil.

But one thing no one disputed was the urgent need to offset fuel price volatility. According to IATA's latest forecast, Brent crude, the main European benchmark, is likely to average $110 a barrel this year - but in just six months spot prices have ricocheted wildly between $128 and $88."
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Friday, July 01, 2011

Southwest Hedging

Virtually every semester a focus of attention is hedging in the airline industry and no firm is studied more than Southwest, so it was surprising when I heard new numbers in this piece.  Staggering numbers in fact:

"While its point to point service and low-cost, low-fare contributed to the company’s past success, its intensive fuel hedging programs is also largely responsible for these past profits. In fact hedging alone saved Southwest Airlines over $3.5 billion and made up almost 83% of the company’s total profits between 1998-2008. [1] [2] "
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Wednesday, December 09, 2009

Mexico's oil hedge

Mexico Has Hedged Oil for 2010 at $57 a Barrel (Update2) - Bloomberg.com:
"Mexico spent $1.172 billion to buy oil hedges for 2010, covering a possible revenue shortfall if production falls for the sixth straight year and prices don’t recover from about a five-year low.

Mexico purchased put options that give it the option, not the obligation, to sell its oil for $57 a barrel next year, the Finance Ministry said in an e-mail statement today.

“We want this as an insurance policy...,"


I am sure this article will yield many interesting class discussions. Note the timing of the hedge but at least they had the right side and were buying options.

Saturday, May 02, 2009

Southwest Airlines and hedging from WSJ

Article - WSJ.com:
"Southwest Airlines Corp. (LUV), the airline industry's most aggressive fuel hedger, remains committed to hedging to lock in future fuel prices, Laura Wright, chief financial officer, told Dow Jones Newswires.

Amid today's volatile oil prices, Southwest has placed new hedges this year using only call options. 'That's our favorite way to hedge,' she said, because it offers protection against rising prices, but allows the company to pay market rates if prices remain low.

'We used call options a lot in the late 1990s, but then they got too expensive' as oil prices rose, Wright said. 'In the last two years, we used a lot more collars,' which combine options contracts, providing protection from falling prices but less upside protection if prices rise. 'We've always used simple methods of hedging, a combination of options, collars and swaps,' she said."

Just this past week a group in my MBA class did a case on Southwest's hedging, so for all of you in class, this should be nothing but review!

Thursday, April 02, 2009

Airlines Return to Hedging - WSJ.com

According to the WSJ, airlines are making a switch from futures to options for their hedging programs.

Airlines Return to Hedging - WSJ.com:
"..oil prices are starting to rebound, creating a quandary for the industry. If the airlines dive back into hedging, they could end up overpaying once again should oil prices fall back. Remaining unhedged would leave airlines exposed should the recent rally extend into a price spike.

The answer, some airlines say, is to hedge their bets on how to hedge. Carriers are relying increasingly on instruments that reduce the burden of rising oil prices, but leave open the option of purchasing fuel at market rates should costs fall back. These derivatives have greater upfront costs, but airlines are unlikely to see a repeat of the massive charges they reported in their fourth quarters from hedging programs gone wrong."
and later
" The airline is using a mechanism known as a call option, which grants it the right to buy oil futures at $60 a barrel, even if their value has risen above that level. The options are pricier than other hedging instruments, but still allow an airline to take advantage of cheaper fuel when oil prices fall.
Excusing the article appears it was written for an introductory finance class, it is interesting to see the switch to options. It is surprising that futures were used as much as they were when they create an obligation to lose if prices move against your hedge. Or as you learn in any finance class: options hedge the moves against you while allowing you to participate in moves that are in your favor. The disadvantage is that they often are not as liquid and have higher transaction costs.

Sunday, February 15, 2009

Crude oil is getting cheaper — so why isn't gas?

Basis risk is something that many do not understand at first. That should change with this example!

From Yahoo: Crude oil is getting cheaper — so why isn't gas?: "
"Right now, in an unusual market trend, West Texas crude is selling for much less than inferior grades of crude from other places around the world. A severe economic downturn has left U.S. storage facilities brimming with it, sending prices for the premium crude to five-year lows.

But it is the overseas crude that goes into most of the gas made in the United States. So prices at the pump will probably keep going up no matter what happens to the benchmark price of crude oil."

Suppose you were hedging gas prices using West Texas Crude futures. The fact that the two prices do not move in unison is what we call basis risk.

Sunday, February 08, 2009

An imperfect hedge: the case of Metallgesellschaft

If you have had me for MBA 610 you know in the "what can go wrong" with derivatives part of the class we usually discuss Metallgesellschaft. It is a classic case of when an imperfect hedge can really hurt you. I just stumbled upon this six minute explanation of what caused their problems that is very good.

Tuesday, November 25, 2008

Airlines and hedging back in the news from AVIATION WEEK

The good people over at Aviation Week seemingly still don't quite get it. Hedging is not supposed to be a money making operation. It is supposed to eliminate (or at least lessen) one form of risk. In this case, those airlines that locked in the price of Jet Fuel need not worry about it. True they are paying more than the spot price, but that always happens. When they made their decision, prices could have gone to $200 and then they would be writing what a great move it was to hedge.

Airlines Made Bad Bets in Fuel Hedging | AVIATION WEEK:
"With oil prices rising to levels near $150 per barrel and then unexpectedly falling by more than 60%, airlines had plenty of opportunity to make wrong bets on fuel. And many did. Ryanair, for instance, locked in fuel prices during the run-up that now mean the carrier has to pay far more than the spot rate. Air France-KLM, too, has been hurt. At current oil prices, the carrier's hedge book means it will pay more than at spot rates for the rest of the financial year, as well as in the next two. The airline in the past quarter took a €373- million ($466-million) financial charge related to hedges.
Note to class, this is a time when the airlines REALLY wish they had purchased call options and not futures. Why? (yeah that will likely be a test question.)

An important point to ponder, given the apparent correlation of fuel prices and the economy really makes the fuel prices the best thing to be hedging (ie. what is the real exposure?).

Monday, October 20, 2008

In Hedging you win some and you lose some.

Southwest's infatuation with fuel hedges backfires - MarketWatch:
"Given oil's relentless ascent, investors have been dumbfounded that Southwest's hedging program wasn't universally used by other airlines, who unfailingly blame their weak financial performance in part on rising fuel costs.
Then came the crash. Oil is now trading at half the price it fetched just three months ago. Suddenly, Southwest's aggressive bet on the market went bad"
No it did not go "bad". Almost by definition hedges will lose money when the risk the firm is hedging moves in their favor. So airlines worry about jet fuel prices. Holding other things constant, airlines drop in value as teh fuel prices rise and vice versa. So, their hedges are designed to "lose" money when the firm can better handle the losses and make money when operations would otherwise be hurting. In doing so they allow the firm (Southwest in this case) to focus on what they do well (run an airline) and not worry about what is outside of their control (price of fuel). The hedges are not designed to make money 100% of the time.

The AP had some more details and did come a bit closer to the story:

"The fuel-hedging deals at the core of Southwest's numbers include options to buy fuel in the future at below-market prices. They succeeded again in saving the airline money on its largest single expense.

Southwest's fuel spending jumped 52 percent, to $1 billion, but the airline paid less per gallon than did other major U.S. airlines.

And while Southwest took a charge to write down the value of its hedges, it also recognized cash settlement gains of $448 million from fuel contracts, and included that money in its net income."

So if I am reading this correctly, the loss was an accounting write-down, while the savings are cash saved.
A good deal in my book! But even if I am not reading it correctly, hedging (as opposed to speculating) is still the way to go in my opinion!



Wednesday, August 20, 2008

Hedging jet fuel prices at airlines

Airline hedging has been a topic of discussion on the FinanceProfessorblog since its inception. With volatile energy prices, it is now a hot topic within the airlines as well. Here is a look at the discussion from FlightGlobal.

Hedge your bets:
"A large part of deciding whether or not to hedge comes down to the way in which ­airlines view hedging. Those that see it as an insurance policy which enables them to ­foresee exactly what they will be paying for fuel, therefore avoiding any nasty shocks, are the most likely to implement long-term fuel hedging strategies.

'Airlines should look at hedging as a ­strategic device that keeps them on an even keel and avoids extremes,' says Leo Drollas, deputy executive director and chief ­economist at the London-based Centre for Global Energy Studies. But he adds that there is a tendency for airlines to hedge tactically rather than ­strategically, meaning they are 'either too heavily hedged or too light on hedging, so they lurch from one situation to another'."
The article also gives some real world examples. For instance from Lufthansa (who I recently flew to Barcelona)

"One airline that follows a strategic approach to fuel hedging and has done so since 1990 is Lufthansa. "Our hedging programme is designed to shield the airline from the adverse impact of the market," says Lufthansa vice-president corporate fuel management Helmut Fredrich. "Our strategy is that we are not ­speculating if there is a low [fuel] price environment. The aim is to mitigate the effects of changing oil prices to give Lufthansa time to adjust to different levels. We start 24 months out, building up our hedges by 5% a month so that after 18 months up to 85-90% of demand is hedged." This means 90% of Lufthansa's fuel is hedged for the coming six months, while 54% is so far hedged for 2009."
Good stuff. Well worth the read (it is fast).

Thursday, May 15, 2008

FT Alphaville » Blog Archive » More than you (may) need to know about commodities hedging

This one will definitely be used in class. From the Financial Times.

How will it be used in class? For instance, the story starts out saying more are hedging now after prices have risen (like closing the barn door after horses have escaped?). It also talks about how much and what type of hedging is currently being done.

FT Alphaville » Blog Archive » More than you (may) need to know about commodities hedging:
"Airlines and other transportation companies are much more active than other energy commodities consumers when it comes to hedging using financial instruments, with nearly 65 per cent of their total exposure hedged in this way. In comparison, the typical industrial company uses financial instruments to hedge just over 40 per cent of its exposure, and utilities hedge an average 48 per cent.

In carrying out their financial hedging strategies, slightly more than 70 per cent of the survey participants said they use OTC swaps. Just over half use OTC options and roughly a third use structured derivatives. Fifty-eight per cent of the companies also say they actively trade physical products with dealers.

Across all industries, hedging strategies vary widely in terms of sophistication and approach, notes Greenwich. Many participants in the 2008 survey said they have no actual hedging policies at all or carry out their hedging through a largely subjective process. Others, especially airlines and oil companies, use advanced formulaic strategies to hedge individual commodities exposures and make strategic decisions about hedging policy at the board level."

Friday, November 30, 2007

An Airline Shrugs at Oil Prices - New York Times


An Airline Shrugs at Oil Prices - New York Times:
"Southwest owns long-term contracts to buy most of its fuel through 2009 for what it would cost if oil were $51 a barrel. The value of those hedges soared as oil raced above $90 a barrel, and they are now worth more than $2 billion. Those gains will mostly be realized over the next two years. Other major airlines passed on buying all but the shortest-term insurance against high fuel prices..."
That other airlines were not hedging (or at least not hedging long-term) has been one of my pet peeves going back as far as the newsletter days. Sure it costs money to hedge, and sure is not without some risks (see for instance this story on what happened when oil prices fell), but hedging makes too much sense not to do.

How does hedging work? Why? The best explanation I have ever seen comes from an old Corporate text book I once used by Rao (do not think it is still in print and I can not find my copy). In it he described how hedging allows management to worry about what they do well and can control (service, pricing, safety etc) and not what they can not control (oil prices in this case).

An other view (the two views are definitely NOT mutually exclusive) is that hedgers have both better access to capital markets and less need to go when the asset (oil) moves in teh 'wrong' direction. My favorite paper in this area has long been Carter, Rogers, and Simkins.

Of course that said, all of the good I can say about hedging goes out the window if firms use the same derivatives to speculate.



Thanks to Felix over at Conde Nast's Porfolio.com for the heads-up on this one.

Monday, April 16, 2007

How good of hedge is gold?

Market.view | A fine and fickle friend | Economist.com:
"A recent paper...attempts to answer this question—or, rather, it attempts to answer two questions. Does gold usually move in the same direction as shares or government bonds? (In other words, is it a hedge in normal times?) And does gold move in the opposite direction when shares or bonds are falling sharply? (Is it a safe haven in extreme times?)

The academics looked at a period from end-November 1995 to end-November 2005. They found....[that] It does well in the short term when shares fall; but if shares fall for long enough, investors start to liquidate their portfolios and gold suffers with all the rest....So those investors who want to buy gold are really making a commodity bet or a currency bet. They are not protecting themselves against a prolonged bear market in shares and bonds.



The academic paper is by Baur and Lucey:
“Is Gold a Hedge or a Safe Haven? An analysis of Stocks, Bonds, and Gold"

Thursday, September 14, 2006

Airline Hedging

You probably have noticed that oil prices have dropped significantly over the past month. However, the Washington Post points out that many airlines are still paying the higher price because they locked in when prices were high.

A look in:
"Like insurance policies, hedging contracts protect against risk, allowing companies to manage damaging price swings....If the market price for oil is above a price limit arranged in a hedging contract, the airline gets the difference, which offsets higher jet fuel costs -- the biggest expense for most airlines.
Of course as this suggests that at times when prices are falling the airlines pay more (unless options are used):
"If the price of oil is below a preset price floor, the airline ends up paying more than the market price...."

"That's the risk you take with hedging," said AMR spokesman Tim Wagner, who would not comment on whether the airline was losing money on its third-quarter hedge. "When it was at $78 dollars per barrel, it looked like you had great deals."

But this "loss" comes when the overall firm is in a better position to handle it, which is exactly what a hedge is designed to do:
"...the airline greatly prefers falling oil prices even if it means some of its fuel hedges are rendered useless, he said...Despite the risk of paying up on some hedges, falling oil prices are a big boost to airlines and eases concerns about slowing demand."
BTW I will use this as an opportunity to mention my favorite airline hedging paper as well. It is by Carter, Rogers, and Simkins. Super short version: hedging is good for you.

Wednesday, November 24, 2004

The value of hedging revisited...

Does Hedging with Derivatives REDUCE THE MARKET Risk Exposure by Bali, Hume, and Martell

Put your thinking caps on for this one!

Short version: Hedging, at least as it is currently being done, may not add to firm value.

Longer version:

In a Modigliani and Miller world nothing really matters. This includes dividend policy, capital structure, and hedging. Hedging is the idea that by buying or selling various assets (be them real (physical) or financial) in an attempt to lower the volatility of the firm.

However, when we leave the MM world, we largely have seen that hedging does matter. In fact, it is by now fairly standard to discuss hedging in advanced corporate finance classes. This discussion typically begins:

Teacher: If we consider a levered firm as a call option, you might ask, “why hedge?” Doesn’t hedging hurt shareholders (by reducing volatility)?"

The standard response (as well as the preponderance of academic research) says that hedging does in fact increase shareholder wealth.

How? The increase is often explained along contracting and information asymmetry lines. For instance from my class notes:
Firms might hedge because:

  1. Lower borrowing costs—Bondholders do not like risk. May be cheaper to hedge for firm than it is for Bondholders.
  2. Allows managers to worry about what they have control over and not things outside their control.
  3. Easier to monitor and to contract with management since you can tell what is their fault and what is not.
  4. Lower expected taxes—Because of progressive taxes.
  5. Reduce labor and payroll expenses since these undiversified stakeholders do not like risk.
  6. Less likely to have to go to capital markets in a “bad” time
  7. Operationally, it may make long term contracts easier to enter and customers will know you are going to be around.

These explanatoons had all been fairly well established in the financial literature. But then this paper from Bali, Hume, and Martell comes along and makes us rethink what we are teaching. It finds that firms are not doing what we had thought!!! and moreover, it may not matter!

Because of the large endogenity problem in derivative use (for example firms select when and if to hedge), the paper “introduces a bivariate econometric framework to consider the effects of changes in macroeconomic factors on market risk exposure simultaneously.”
Then (in what I think is a really cool part of the paper, the authors use a

“modified two-stage market model to include a firm’s risk exposure levels relative to returns in the first stage regression. In that stage, our model estimates an individual firm’s risk exposures:

(i) currency exposure is the sensitivity of the firm’s value as proxied by the firm’s stock return to the unanticipated change in an exchange rate index (currency beta);

(ii) interest-rate exposure is the sensitivity of the firm’s value to the unanticipated change in an interest rate index (interest rate beta);

(iii) commodity exposure is the sensitivity of the firm’s value to the unanticipated change in a commodity index (commodity beta).

In the second stage, the impact of hedging is tested by the hypotheses that currency, interest rate, and commodity
exposures are negatively related to derivatives use and positively related to the levels of a firm’s real operations....Real operations are proxies for a firm’s need to hedge and determine a firm’s exposure level.

So once this is done what do they find? Not what one might have thought!
For the univariate tests, the authors find that hedging rarely reduced exposure and in some cases actually increased the risk! (Which suggests that the firms may have been speculating—a definite no-no!).

Again in the author’s words:
"Our empirical findings do not generally support the hypothesis that derivatives positions offset risk movements….Further, the empirical results do not support a positive association between real operations and exposures.”

“Except for one year for interest rate exposure, there
is little evidence that derivatives use reduces risk exposures for the firms studied. There is some evidence that user firms are increasing risk exposure in the use of commodity derivatives.”

“To the extent that there is no change in market risk exposure, then this suggests that:

1) firms use other forms of risk management such as operational hedging from global diversification, or production management, or;

2) firms do not fully hedge the extent of the effect of exchange rate movements, or;

3) interest rate, exchange rate and commodity risks are economically insignificant relative to the firm’s return, or;

4) firms do not have an economic justification for derivatives hedging if they are large, diversified, and of good credit quality, except in special cases, or;

5) they use derivatives to facilitate internal contracting, or informational asymmetries."


Which simplified means that firms we expect to hedge, are not hedging (or at least did not from 1995-1998) and moreover are not hedging like we would have counseled. WHY? Maybe because the firms studied were large and the diversification and operational hedges available to the firms off-set the need to hedge using derivatives.

http://207.36.165.114/NewOrleans/Papers/4201122.pdf

VERY INTERESTING!! I will be watching this one for paper updates etc.

BTW This may have been the most difficult paper I have summarized in a while. It was rather complex and to make this summary understandable for all, I left quite a bit out. I HIGHLY recommend you download and read the actual paper!!